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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS 
 
Upstream – Federal  
 
10th Circuit 
Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Env't v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 831 (10th 
Cir. 2019). 
 
Environmental Groups brought suit against the Bureau of Land 
Management alleging violations of the National Historic Preservation Act 
(NHPA) and the national Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for granting 
applications for permits to drill hydraulically fracked wells on public lands. 
On a de novo review, the court ruled that Environmental Groups had 
standing despite group members not identifying specific visits to each well 
at issue since their environmental harms were caused by the challenged 
permits rather than the actual wells. Further, the court determined that the 
environmental assessments (EAs) prepared by BLM in connection with the 
applications for permits did not arbitrarily define area of potential effects in 
violation of the NHPA and nothing required them to consider indirect 
effects. As such, Environmental Groups failed to carry their burden to show 
that BLM acted arbitrarily or capriciously in conducting their EAs in 
connection with the permits to drill hydraulically fracked wells. 
 
N.D. California 
California v. Bureau of Land Management, Case No. 18-cv-00521-HSG, 
2019 WL 1455335 (N.D. Cal. April 2, 2019). 
 
State and Citizen Group sued the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the 
Secretary of the Interior, and the Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals 
Management for rescinding a litigated 2015 Rule concerning hydraulic 
fracturing in public and tribal lands. The present dispute concerned State 
and Citizen Group trying to make BLM include nine additional documents 
to complete the administrative record. The court held that documents 4, 7, 
and 9 were not admissible, because they were just calendar entries with no 
substantive value, and which were not considered by any policy makers 
when forming the decision to respecting the 2015 Rule. Document 8 was a 
briefing memo for the Secretary of the Interior, which he considered as part 
of the decision to rescind the 2015 Rule. The court thus held that document 
8 had to be added to the administrative record. The court held that 
documents 3, 5, and 6, relating to the 10th Circuit litigation of the Rule, 
were not admissible, because State and Citizen Group were unable to show 
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“clear evidence” that would overcome the presumption of propriety on the 
part of BLM in its selection of which litigation documents contained 
relevant information for the new litigation. Documents 1 and 2, 
Congressional testimony about the 2015 Rule, suffered from the same 
problem, no “clear evidence” to override deference given to BLM in its 
document selection process. The court held against her including 
documents 1 and 2. The court thus granted the motion in regards to 
document 8, but denied the motion in regards to the other eight documents. 
 
D. Colorado 
Citizens for a Healthy Cmty. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 1:17-cv-
02519-LTB-GPG, 2019 WL 1382785 (D. Colo. March 27, 2019). 
 
Organization sued the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) and other 
agencies (collectively “Agencies”) for judicial review of approvals by the 
Agencies of certain development plans, natural gas wells, well pads, and 
permits to drill. Organization brought suit under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”). Organization claimed that the Agencies acted in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner and that they did not consider the foreseeable indirect 
effects resulting from the combustion of oil and gas. The court found that 
the Agencies had violated NEPA. The court explained that the Agencies did 
not take a close enough look at the either the impacts of the combustion or 
at the cumulative impacts on mule deer and elk.  
 
E.D. Michigan 
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Transp. et al., No. 17-cv-
10031, 2019 WL 1426310 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2019). 
 
The National Wildlife Federation argues that the interpretation of the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990, which amends the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), is 
arbitrary and capricious. The court found that to comply with the Pipeline 
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (“PHMSA”), PHMSA must 
explain “with specificity” their reasoning in approving the response plans, 
while considering the impacts the environmental plan may have on any 
endangered species or their habitats. While CWA requires owners and 
operators of oil facilities to prepare a response plan that meets certain 
requirements into navigable waters, PHMSA decides whether to approve 
plans for onshore facilities. NWF challenged PHMSA’s approval because it 
failed to satisfy CWA, and PHMSA failed to undertake an environmental 
analysis. Since the agency failed to explain its conclusions adequately, 
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PHMSA’s approvals were “arbitrary and capricious.” PHMSA arrived at its 
decision using a checklist questionnaire; however, the yes-or-no answers 
were unsatisfactory in light of the questions asked. The court rejected 
PHMSA’s argument that it has no discretion to approve response plans that 
meet CWA requirements. Since PHMSA must determine whether the plant 
has met CWA requirements, it logically requires the agency to exercise 
“considerable environmental judgment.” This means that PHMSA does in 
fact have discretion. 
 
W.D. Pennsylvania 
Westmoreland Cty v. CNX Gas Co., No. 2:16-CV-422, 2019 WL 1427155 
(W.D. Pa. March 29, 2019). 
 
County brought suit against Operator for breach of contract and conversion. 
County claimed that Operator breached the leases by wrongfully deducting 
certain post-production costs from landowner royalties and committed 
conversion of the royalty payments in the same manner. Because County 
could not prove detrimental reliance on Operator’s revenue forecasts, the 
court denied their motion for partial summary judgment. Further, the court 
explained that a claim of conversion could not stand on the same grounds as 
a breach of contract in this instance. The court further partially denied 
Operator’s motion for summary judgment because there were multiple 
disputes as to material facts. 
 
Upstream – State  
 
Pennsylvania 
EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills, No. 4 WAP 2018, 2019 WL 
2313377 (Pa. May 31, 2019). 
 
Natural Gas Producer brought suit against City Council for denying a 
permit to operate as a conditional use facility. When denying the permit, the 
Council stated that the Producer had not met its burden of proof for a 
conditional use application, the burden never shifted to the objectors, and 
that the facility would not promote the health, quality of life, and property 
of the residents. Further, the Council also relied heavily upon testimony of 
objectors at a town hall meeting that came from residents of another 
municipality regarding the impact of such a facility operated by the same 
company on their health, quality of life, and property. On an abuse of 
discretion and plain error standard, the Court held that evidentiary 
admissibility of residents of another municipality regarding the effects of a 
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particular land use, that was significantly similar to the proposed land use, 
was both relevant and probative as to whether the proposed facility would 
have an adverse effect on the township.  
 
Midstream – Federal 
 
10th Circuit 
Naylor Farms, Inc. v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, 923 F.3d 779 (10th Cir. 
2019). 
 
Royalty Interest Owners brought suit against Energy Corporation alleging 
that Energy Corporation systematically underpaid Owners by improperly 
deducting from their royalty payments certain gas-treatment costs that 
Energy Corporation should have shouldered under Oklahoma law. The 
court determined that under Oklahoma law, lessees are subject to an 
implied duty of marketability that requires them to provide a marketable 
product to the market and are generally precluded from passing costs 
incurred in making a product marketable to royalty owners. Specifically, to 
make gas marketable, it must undergo processes such as gathering, 
compressing, dehydrating, transporting, and producing and the cost of 
which is borne by the lessees. However, the question of whether gas 
produced from wells was a marketable product that was not subject to the 
implied duty of marketability was subject to class-wide proof to satisfy the 
commonality requirements to be a class. Since a jury could have determined 
whether the gas was marketable without individually assessing quality of 
the gas, expert testimony was sufficient to determine that gas produced at 
the wellhead needed at least one service each and therefore not yet 
marketable. As such, the court was justified in affirming the district court’s 
granting of class certification. 
 
Traditional Generation – State  
 
New Mexico 
Pub. Serv. Co. of New Mexico v. New Mexico Pub. Regulation Comm'n, 
No. S-1-SC-36115, 2019 WL 2137168 (N.M. May 16, 2019). 
 
Utility Company sought review of a decision by the New Mexico Public 
Regulation Commission granting some, but not all, an increases in retail 
electric rats sought by Utility Company. The court ruled that by denying 
Utility Company any future recovery for its nuclear decommissioning costs 
related to Palo Verde capacity, Commission denied Utility Company due 
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process of law without providing Utility Company notice and an 
opportunity to be heard on the matter. However, the court ruled that the rest 
of the challenged decisions were lawfully decided and reasonable since 
Commission utilized the established prudence standard for costs of facilities 
that a utility could include in its base rate. Further, Commission’s decision 
that Utility Company’s decision to repurchase a portion of generators’ 
capacity and renew leases on the remaining capacity was imprudent was 
based on substantial evidence. Further, Commission’s wide discretion 
allowed for their decision to limit Utility Company’s recovery for the 
amount it paid to purchase capacity and recover on five renewed leases.  
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS 
 
Federal 
 
Federal Claims 
Whiteland Holdings, L.P. v. United States, No. 18-1081L, 2019 WL 
2158874 (Fed. Cl. May 17, 2019). 
 
Holding Companies moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s dismissal 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and relief from that order against 
United States. Originally, the Companies alleged that the government’s 
operations and disposal methods at a Mineral Superfund Site resulted in 
environmental contamination, which effected a taking without just 
compensation. On appeal, they argue that the court applied the wrong set of 
legal standards that apply to an environmental takings action. However, the 
court found that the Companies had not alleged an intervening change in 
law since the order was effected, did not rely on any new evidence, but 
instead merely tried to reargue their initial position. As such, the court held 
their motion for reconsideration meritless. Further, there was no manifest 
injustice because the court did not err in concluding the Companies claim 
accrued no later than 2011. As such, there was no mistake in the initial suit 
that would entitle them to reconsideration or relief from the order and the 
court, therefore, denied their motions. 
 
D. Arizona 
Ak-Chin Indian Community v. Central Arizona Water Conservation 
District, No. CV-17-00918-PHX-DGC, 2019 WL 1356310 (D. Arizona 
March 26, 2019). 
 
The Ak Chin Indian Community ( “Community”) is a federally recognized 
Indian tribe. The Central Arizona Water Conservation District (“CAWCD”) 
delivers water to Community through the Central Arizona Project (“CAP”). 
The Ak Chin Water Rights Act pf 1984 (“1984 Act”) addresses water 
Community is entitled to receive. The 1984 Act provides that Community 
receives additional water or reduces water supplied under certain 
conditions. At issue is whether the additional water supply allocated to 
Community is allowed if there is another entity that has an allocation or 
contractual right to water but does not use the amount in the given year. 
Community argues that the unused water is “available” for other Indian 
purposes to fill the additional water supply to Community. CAWCD argues 
that the additional water can only be received if (1) the Secretary of the 
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Interior allocates water to the use, and (2) the user enters into a contract 
with the Secretary of the Interior for the delivery of water, thus Community 
has received their right to the water by satisfying both steps. Because 
Community has not entered into a contract with the provision applying to 
the additional water and all the water is already contracted for or reserved, 
there is no more water “available.” The court found for Community because 
of the additional water supplied over the years supported the position that 
additional water may be supplied despite the Community not having a 
contract and other entities having a contractual right to the water.  
 
S.D. California 
California River Watch v. City of Escondido, 2019 WL 1429236 (S.D. Cal. 
Mar. 29, 2019). 
 
Nonprofit brought citizen’s suit against City under the Clean Water Act. 
Nonprofit alleges City violated its CWA National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System Permit through collection system discharges caused by 
underground exfiltration and collection system surface discharges caused 
by sanitary sewer overflows. City moved to dismiss, claiming Nonprofit’s 
60-day notice was insufficient and the complaint failed to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. The 60-day notice of intent to file suit 
must contain several provisions: (1) specific standard alleged to have been 
violated; (2) activity constituting alleged violation; (3) persons responsible 
for violation; (4) location of violation; (5) dates of violation; and (6) full 
name and address of person giving notice. Court found Nonprofit’s 
complaint sufficiently addressed these provisions. Regarding the allegations 
of unlawful discharges, Nonprofit is not required to list every violation with 
its corresponding dates; a range of dates is sufficient notice. To burden 
plaintiffs otherwise would be contrary to the policy behind allowing CWA 
citizen suits. Nonprofit gave City sufficient notice and detail for City to 
identify and remedy its alleged violations, regarding both the sanitary sewer 
overflows, and the underground exfiltration and failure to comply with 
effluent limitations. Accordingly, Nonprofit pleaded enough facts to state a 
claim for relief. Court denied City’s motion to dismiss. 
 
United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., No. 51CV1247-GPC-RBB, 
2019 WL 2184819 (S.D. Cal. May 21, 2019). 
 
Government brought action to quiet title its rights to use the Santa 
Margarita River water systems in San Diego and Riverside counties. 
Objectors argued that the Steering Committee should not be responsible for 
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the proposed costs from the Watermaster for his involvement in the Anza 
Settlement Proceeding; a proceeding that solely involves Tribes, of which 
Steering Committee member is part of. The court determined that (1) the 
Watermaster’s duties cover the entirety of the Santa Margarita Watershed, 
(2) the Steering Committee members consist of substantial water users 
within the Watershed, and (3) their purpose is to facilitate litigation. 
However, the court also stated that a substantial water user, those who 
irrigate eight or more acres or produce the equivalent, would bear the 
substantial brunt of the Watermaster’s costs. The court found that the 
decision to have each entity of the Steering Commission pay for the 
Watermaster’s cost is not burdensome or unfair. As such, the court 
overruled the objections and approved the Watermaster Report. 
 
E.D. New York 
Long Island Pure Water Ltd. v. Cuomo, 2019 WL 1317335 (E.D. N.Y. 
March 22, 2019). 
 
The Navy and predecessors to aerospace Company operated a military 
aircraft construction facility. The facility discharged hazardous chemicals 
into the soil, including perchloroethylene (“PCE”), trichloroethylene 
(“TCE”), vinyl chloride, and methyl chloroform. The chemicals spread into 
the soil and created elevated radium levels and unnatural levels of 
radioactive gas, radon. Long Island Pure Water (“LIPW”) alleged that the 
Navy and Company failed to follow Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) and Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”). The Navy and Company 
moved to dismiss. The court granted defendant’s motions and dismissed the 
action. The court dismissed the action based on sovereign immunity, and no 
exception applied because LIPW was seeking costs rather than injunctive 
relief. The court also noted that seeking a private counsel to oversee a 
government cleanup may be barred by the very statutes their action sought 
to enforce and cited 42 U.S.C.A § 9613(h), which limits judicial review of 
certain federal cleanup efforts. 
 
W.D. Washington 
United States v. Pillon, No. C18-1845-JCC, 2019 WL 2172839 (W.D. 
Wash. May 20, 2019). 
 
Property Owner who was using his property as an unpermitted landfill was 
sued by United States’ Environmental Protection agency to be given the 
right to: (1) remove known, contaminated soils, (2) test soils to ensure that 
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all of the contaminated soils are removed, and (3) install groundwater 
monitoring wells to monitor for contamination in the water. The court held 
that since the EPA designated specific zones of likely contamination and 
only planned to be there for two months, their plan was tailored and not 
overly broad. Further, the court held that under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), the 
EPA may obtain access to enter a site through consent of the owner, an 
administrative order, or a court order directing compliance with the request 
if the property is of the correct type. Here, the court stated that there was no 
genuine dispute as to whether the property was the type of property that 
CERCLA enables the EPA to access. Additionally, the EPA had a 
reasonable basis for believing there to be a release or a threat of release of 
hazardous substances since they had taken samples from the Property. As 
such, they granted the requested response actions. 
 
State  
 
Georgia 
City of Guyton v. Barrow, No. S18G0944, 2019 WL 2167460 (Ga. May 20, 
2019). 
 
Property Owner brought action seeking judicial review of whether the 
Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Department of Natural 
Resources (EPD) properly issued a permit to the City of Guyton to build 
and operate a land application system that would use treated wastewater for 
irrigation. The principal issue the court addressed is what standard of 
deference was to be given for an agency interpretation of a legal rule; 
specifically, the antidegradation rule, which is designed to limit the 
discharge of pollutants into Georgia and United States waters in compliance 
with the Clean Water Act (CWA). Ultimately, the court determined the 
antidegradation rule did not require EPD to complete antidegradation 
analysis for nonpoint source discharge. Since the antidegradation rule 
merely satisfied the state’s requirements under CWA, which only regulates 
point sources, CWA, and therefore the antidegradation rule, did not apply to 
the nonpoint sources of water. Further, the court noted that the 
Environmental Protection Agency could not force states to regulate conduct 
indirectly where they could not regulate the same conduct directly. 
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Illinois 
Tzakis v. Berger Excavating Contractors, Inc., 2019 IL App (1st) 170859, 
2019 WL 2320960 (Ill. May 30, 2019). 
 
Homeowners brought suit against Hospital constructed adjacent to their 
neighborhood alleging that the hospital is constructed in such a way that the 
hospital’s storm water drainage system discharged onto Homeowners 
properties and caused flooding. Further, Homeowners alleged that several 
Cities violated various duties with respect to the drainage system. The trial 
court applied the Coleman standard and granted defendant’s motion to 
dismiss on the basis of the public duty rule, which states that government’s 
duty is not to any individual but the community at large. This rule was 
abolished by the Illinois Supreme Court roughly six months after the initial 
dismissal was granted. Plaintiff’s sought retroactive application of the 
abolishment of the rule. The court determined that the application of the 
Coleman standard, and therefore the granting of the motion to dismiss, was 
erroneous on this basis. However, the court also held that the dismissals on 
the basis of the Tort Immunity Act were properly dismissed. 
 
Missouri 
Altidor v. Broadfield, No. ED 107087, 2019 WL 2179970 (Mo. Ct. App. 
May 21, 2019). 
 
Homeowners brought action against Owner and Operator of a metal 
fabrication facility alleging toxic contamination from the site. On appeal of 
a granted motion for summary judgment, the court held that Facility did not 
actually cause the spill of contaminants of the site since it was undisputed 
that all spills pre-dated ownership by Facility and there was no corporate 
affiliation between Facility and prior owners. Additionally, even if there 
were more spill after Facility took ownership, no migratory contaminate 
plume could have reached Homeowners’ property. The court also 
determined that Homeowners failed to carry their burden to show that 
Facility was a “mere continuation” from the previous owners, and thus 
liable for their debts, since they could not show any of the relevant factors. 
Further, the court held that a genuine issue of material fact precluded 
summary judgment on whether Facility failed to prevent migration of 
contaminants off-site. 
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South Carolina 
Sierra Club v. S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 826 S.E.2d 595 (S.C. 
2019). 
 
Nonprofit appealed Department’s renewal of Operator’s disposal facility for 
radioactive wastes. Department licenses and oversees Operator’s facility 
under Atomic Energy Act. Operator must comply with AEA regulations 
and additional Department requirements. Nonprofit contends Operator’s 
waste disposal practices did not meet regulatory requirements by not 
adequately preventing groundwater contamination by radioactive 
pollutants. Initially, the Administrative Court ordered Operator to conduct 
studies to investigate implementation of procedure that would better shelter 
the waste facilities from rain water and the subsequent pollution. Court may 
only reverse if Administrative Court’s initial decision was an error of law. 
Operator’s appeal focused on its compliance with the State Code governing 
disposal and minimization of water migration onto disposal units of 
hazardous materials. Court determined relevant sections of the State Code 
were technical requirements that Operator must fulfill under its license, but 
Operator is not required to take any specific action to achieve compliance. 
Operator’s duty was to evaluate and report on compliance concerns. Court 
determined that State Code only required Operator to detect and remove 
water and other liquids from disposal units, rather than radioactive waste 
material. Court affirmed that the respective State Code which requires 
minimization of water migration onto disposal units does include rainfall 
and that minimization does not require total prevention. Additionally, 
Department must consider ALARA when evaluating Operator’s approaches 
to compliance, but ALARA may not be the only consideration. The Court 
also is not required to give deference to Department’s interpretation of its 
statutes when the interpretation is contrary to the plain meaning of the code. 
Requiring Department and Operator to affirmatively demonstrate 
compliance with regulations does not impermissibly shift the burden of 
proof. The initial burden of proof was on Nonprofit, but the burden shifted 
to Department and Operator on appeal. 
 
Vermont 
Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. Parkway Cleaners, No. 2018-165, 2019 WL 
1412580 (Vt. Mar. 29, 2019). 
 
State filed action against Drycleaner claiming that they were liable for not 
cleaning up a carcinogenic chemical that had been dumped onsite or 
released from its equipment. Drycleaner filed summary judgment motion 
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alleging that State failed to show that the chemical had been released on the 
property during the time they owned the property. The trial court granted 
summary judgment and injunctive relief motions for State, finding that the 
Drycleaner was strictly liable for the clean-up and that State was entitled to 
injunctive relief, requiring Drycleaner to continue investigating the site and 
begin necessary remediation. Drycleaner appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Vermont, claiming that: (1) it was not liable for remediation of the site 
because they were not the owners at the time of the spill, (2) the injunction 
requiring the investigation of the site was not appropriate as it did not 
outline what was required of the Drycleaner in sufficient detail, and (3) that 
the trial court should not have allowed the action to be commenced by State 
because the statute of limitations had run. The Court affirmed the lower 
court ruling holding that: (1) Drycleaner was strictly liable for remediation 
of environment because of release of chemical, (2) injunction requiring 
Drycleaner to perform site investigation and corrective action was 
sufficiently specific, and (3) Drycleaner waived statute of limitations 
defense. The Court held that the plain language of the statue clearly 
outlined that Drycleaner should be strictly liable as the current owner for 
the cleanup, and the injunctive relief was proper because it established that 
it must implement a clear plan of mediation that would be submitted to the 
agency. Additionally, the Court held that Drycleaner waived its statute of 
limitation defense when it failed to appropriately raise that affirmative 
defense in its Answer to State’s original motion for summary judgment. 
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SELECTED LAND DECISIONS 
 
Federal  
 
Federal Claims 
BP Am. Prod. Co. v. United States, No. 18-607, 2019 WL 1435047 (Fed. 
Cl. April 1, 2019). 
 
Company brought suit against Government to recover over a million dollars 
in, allegedly, statutorily mandated interest on oil and gas overpayments. 
Company brought suit pursuant to the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty 
Management Act of 1982 (“FOGRMA”) and the Royalty Simplification 
Fairness Act of 1996 (“RSFA”). Government filed a motion to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Government’s 
motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. The court 
explained that because Company could not point to any specific lease 
provision requiring Government to pay interest on its royalty overpayments 
or incorporating former sections into the leases by reference, that portion of 
the complaint had to be dismissed. 
 
S.D. New York 
Bakken Resources Inc. v. Edington, 15 Civ. 8686, 2019 WL (ALC), 2019 
WL 1437273 (S.D. New York Mar. 29, 2019). 
 
Company brought action against Group alleging action under Racketeering 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). As part of a reverse 
merger, Group proposed depositing mineral assets into a public shell 
company. Group solicited investor contacts for a Private Placement 
Memorandum. Group controlled the shell company. In 2011, Company 
found that Group had misrepresented their background. Company then 
retained outside counsel. Based on this discovery, Group determined to 
cease any work relating to Company. Company brought complaint based on 
RICO violations, tortious interference, and violations of the Securities 
Exchange Act. Group filed Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim. Group also filed a 
Motion for Sanctions against Company for the RICO claim. On the issue of 
jurisdiction, the court found that (1) RICO jurisdictional requirements were 
not met because Group is not domiciled in New York and Group’s single 
trip to New York did not prove minimum contacts; (2) New York’s Long-
Arm Statute was not met as Company failed to establish any personal 
jurisdiction, even when all allegations were construed in favor of Company; 
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(3) the court did not need to transfer venue as refusing to do so did not 
severely prejudice either party. On the issue of the Sanctions for the RICO 
claim, the court found that (1) section 107 of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act bars RICO claims alleging securities fraud; (2) 
Company’s assertions created a bona fide dispute of fact or law; (3) 
Company’s argument is not so devoid of strength to warrant sanctions. 
Therefore, the court denied the request for sanctions. In conclusion, court 
granted Group’s motion to dismiss, denied Company’s motion to transfer, 
and denied motions for sanctions. 
 
S.D. Ohio 
Ralph W. Talmage Trust v. Bradley, No. 2:17-cv-544, 2019 WL 1384430 
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2019). 
 
Trustee was conveyed an overriding 5% royalty interest in a lease. The 
assignment was made with exceptions providing that (1) the assignment did 
not apply to the currently producing wells, but did apply to non-producing 
well and future wells; (2) the Overriding Royalty Interests (“ORRI”) did 
not apply to the first well drilled by Assignor offsetting each of the 
producing wells; (3) should the Assignor exercise pooling rights, ORRI 
shall be unitized; (4) if any leasehold estate is less than 100%, ORRI shall 
be proportionately reduced. This was recorded in two out of the three 
counties that housed the land. It was not recorded in Noble County. 
Assignees later obtained an overlapping lease. Assignees and Trustee both 
sought judgment to quiet title and a ruling on whether Trustee’s override is 
valid. Assignees argued that summary judgment should be entered because 
Trustee violated the Ohio oil and gas recording statute. Trustee argued this 
recording statute did not apply to royalty interest leases. Court found that 
overriding royalty interests are interests in oil and gas leases because 
royalty interest is derived from the working interest of an oil and gas lease. 
However, the court declined to invalidate Trustee’s assignment based on a 
question of fact as to whether Assignees were aware of the assignment and 
because Trustee attempted to cure the deficiency in recording. Therefore, 
the court denied Assignee’s motion for partial summary judgment and 
granted in part and denied in part Trustee’s motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
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S.D. Texas 
Goodrich Petroleum Co. v. Goodrich Petroleum Corp. (In re Goodrich 
Petroleum Corp.), No: 16-31975, 2019 WL 1313399 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
Mar. 20, 2019). 
 
Landowner Royalty Owner (“LRO”) filed suit alleging Lessee improperly 
withheld royalty payments by deducting production costs arising from a 
third-party operator (“Operator”); LRO further alleged that the relationship 
between Lessee and Operator was beneficial to Lessee. The royalty clause 
at dispute called for LRO to bear proportionate production costs incurred by 
Lessee from unaffiliated third-parties whose relationship was not beneficial 
to Lessee. LRO and Lessee filed motions for summary judgment with the 
district court. The district court granted Lessee’s motion, finding that LRO 
is obligated to pay its proportionate share of production costs associated 
with Operator activities. LRO asserted in its motion that Operator became 
affiliated with all parties involved when unitization of wells occurred, and 
this created a beneficiary relationship with Lessee. The district court 
granted Lessee’s motion for summary judgment finding that the Operator 
and Lessee were unaffiliated entities because: (1) unitization does not alter 
the relationship between the two wholly separate corporate entities and the 
purpose of unitization is to maximize production of a single reservoir; (2) if 
LRO’s interpretation of ‘unaffiliated’ was granted it would be too broad 
and would go against the principles of contract interpretation; and (3) that 
the presence of an agency relationship between Operator’s subsidiary and 
Lessee does not alter the contractual relationship into a parent-subsidiary 
one. The district court further found that no beneficial interest was created 
because the relationship was contractual between Operator and Lessee, and 
the Lessee retained legal title to the hydrocarbons produced. 
 
D. Utah 
HEAL Utah v. PacifiCorp, No. 2:16-cv-00120, 2019 WL 1318350 (D. Utah 
Mar. 22, 2019). 
 
Groups brought suit under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). Corporation and 
Groups both filed motions for summary judgment on the claim. In 2007, 
Corporation installed a collection system in their surge pond. Group 
claimed Corporation violated the CWA when it installed the system without 
a § 404 permit. Under the CWA, § 404 authorizes permits to discharge 
dredged or fill material. In 2008, Corporation moved sediments from their 
surge pond. Groups argued that storms erode the sediment and move it 
downstream. Groups claimed this was a § 404 violation as they failed to 
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receive a permit under the CWA. Further, in 2016, Corporation repaired a 
pipe by excavating a part of the collection system, which Groups claimed 
was another § 404 violation. Court found that (1) Groups failed to file 
notice for the 2016 claim, so the 2016 should be dismissed. (2) None of 
Groups members suffered an injury in fact as required by Art. III of the 
Constitution. They did not suffer economic, environmental, aesthetic, or 
procedural energy. Therefore, they were barred from bringing suit. The 
court granted Corporation’s motion for summary judgment. 
 
W.D. Virginia 
Dixon Lumber Co. v. Austinville Limestone Co., No. 7:16-cv-00130, 2019 
WL 1441631 (W.D. Va. March 31, 2019).  
 
Property Owner 1 (Dixon) brought suit against Property Owner 2 
(Austinville) to recover costs of remediation and declaratory relief under 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (“CERCLA”). The court was charged with deciding who of the two 
parties should be held responsible for costs of environmental remediation 
and reclamation of Property Owner 1’s real property. Property Owner 2 had 
discharged pollution in the form of mine tailings into Property Owner 1’s 
stream. The court granted both parties relief on their respective CERCLA 
claims. The court explained that Property Owner 1 should be held 
responsible for eighty percent of the costs and that Property Owner 2 for 
twenty percent and all the costs of “hauling.” The court reasoned that 
because Property Owner 1 played a large part in the high cost of 
remediation, that they should bare a large portion themselves. 
 
State  
 
Mississippi 
Barham v. Mississippi Power Company, 266 So.3d 994 (Miss. Mar. 28, 
2019). 
 
Owners brought action against Company seeking declaratory judgment to 
confirm and quiet title to property. Owners argued they owned lignite under 
Company’s building, which Company did not dispute. Company filed suit 
to confirm and to quiet title, as well as asserting that lignite could only be 
removed economically by surface mining. Company asked to enjoin all 
defendants, and, in the alternative, asked for declaratory judgment that 
lignite removal would destroy the surface of the land, rending it unusable. 
Company also moved to transfer to chancery court, and their motion was 
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granted. In chancery court, both company and Owners filed motion for 
summary judgment agreeing no material facts were in dispute, asking for 
requested relief. Company argued Family was equitably estopped from 
claiming ownership of the lignite because they had remained silent while 
Company substantially improved the land. Family argued that Company 
wrongfully covered the lignite Family was entitled to, and that Family was 
not justly compensated. The chancery court denied summary judgment to 
Company on ownership and equitable-estoppel claims, and granted 
summary judgment on deprivation of Family’s mining rights. Parties 
appealed. The court, reviewing de novo found that (1) the chancery court 
may hear the case because it has jurisdiction over quiet title actions; (2) that 
the chancery’s grant and denial of summary judgment was rightful. The 
denied motion for summary judgment was due to the motion being fact 
based. The granted motion for summary judgment was due to the 
Mississippi Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation act, which caused 
Family to lose rights to the lignite. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower 
court’s ruling. 
 
Pennsylvania 
PBS Coals Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, No. 140 C.D. 2018, 2019 WL 
1387883 (Commw. Ct. of PA, Mar. 28, 2019). 
 
Company brought action against Department, alleging Department had 
effectuated a de facto taking. Company claimed that construction of a 
highway isolated their land, and therefore made the land incapable of 
mining. Company requested court find the compensation owed to them due 
to the claimed de facto taking. Department responded that Company still 
had access to the beneficial use and enjoyment of their property, could still 
access their property, and that Company had not applied for mining permits 
before Department began construction. Trial court found that Company 
failed to establish a de facto taking because Company did not show 
exceptional circumstances that “substantially deprived them of their ability 
to mine coal.” Company appealed. The court found that (1) because there 
was no specific language in the lease providing Company a right-of-way 
across land, trial court erred in finding Company had alternative access; (2) 
there was no implied right to use the surface of the land to transport coal; 
(3) the land was landlocked because of this lack of implied right; (4) 
Department’s actions caused Company to lose access to their land because 
it became landlocked. The court reversed and remanded, and ordered a 
determination of the amount of damages to Company. 
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West Virginia 
Bruce McDonald Holding Co. v. Addington, Inc., No. 17-0847, 2019 WL 
1319859 (W. Va. Mar. 20, 2019). 
 
Landowner Royalty Owner (“LRO”) entered into a coal lease with Lessee 
in June of 1978, which required recurring minimum royalty payments in 
lieu of coal mining. Lessee sought to terminate the lease in June 1984, 
giving notice to LRO that it sought arbitration to determine whether 
commercial quantities of coal were present on the leased acreage. LRO 
filed suit seeking to compel payment of royalties and to stay arbitration. In 
1988, the trial court found that Lessee owed LRO the minimum royalty 
payments due under the lease instead of commencing mining activities. 
LRO accepted the minimum royalty payments from 1988 until 2016 when 
they filed suit seeking declaratory judgments that: (1) Lessee had obligation 
to diligently mine coal, and (2) annual minimum royalties were to be based 
on comparable sales of neighboring mines, along with damages for the 
breach of duty and miscalculated royalties. Both Lessee and LRO filed 
summary judgment motions with the trial court. The trial court granted 
summary judgment against LRO. LRO on appeal asserted two claims: (1) 
seeking declaratory judgment that Lessee had a duty to diligently mine coal, 
and (2) that minimum royalty payments should be determined off 
comparable sales of coal by other mining companies. The Supreme Court of 
West Virginia affirmed the lower court judgment, holding that LRO claims 
were disposed of via waiver and collateral estoppel. The Court reasoned 
that LRO waived any duty on Lessee’s part to “diligently mine coal” 
because they waited 28 years to compel performance of Lessee’s duty after 
filing original suit, they had knowledge of their right to require Lessee to so 
act, and by accepting the minimum royalty payments instead of requiring 
diligent mining, they waived their claim. The Court then held that LRO was 
collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of “comparable coal sales” to 
be the baseline for the minimum royalty determination since the issue was 
litigated in the original 1988 suit, in which the trial court fixed the rate and 
LRO could have brought issue with the trial court’s decision at that time. 
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SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 
Federal 
 
D. District of Columbia  
Potomac Riverkeeper Inc. v. Wheeler, No. 17-cv-1023 (DLF), 2019 WL 
1440128 (D.D.C. March 31, 2019). 
 
Conservatory and Recreational Organizations (CRO) brought suit against 
the EPA, because the EPA approved the 2016 Impaired Waters List. The 
list did not include any part of the Shenandoah River, despite complaints 
from various organizations and citizens about excessive algae growth. CRO 
raised a motion for summary judgment, and EPA brought a cross motion 
for summary judgment. State refused to use citizen-provided information 
about the algae growth in the Shenandoah River when classifying State 
waters as impaired. State’s impairment assessment claimed that it needed 
more information before classifying the river as impaired. EPA deferred to 
State’s assessment and approved the classifications. EPA found that State’s 
decision to wait and gather more data was reasonable. CRO argued that 
EPA was unreasonable in relying on State’s limited algae data, data which 
rendered the impairment assessment ineffective. However, the court found 
that EPA correctly deferred to State regarding the decision to not use 
CRO’s algae data when gathering more information about the river’s algae 
situation. The court also found that CRO’s argument that EPA wrongly 
relied on State’s commitment “to develop numerical thresholds for 
assessing algae-related impairment in the future” was unpersuasive. EPA 
only marginally relied on State’s future assessments to make its decision; 
EPA’s decision was simply that State’s assessment and desire for more 
information was reasonable. Thus, the court granted EPA’s cross-motion 
for summary judgment, denying CRO’s motion. 
 
Continental Resources, Inc. v. Gould, Civil Action No. 14-65 (RDM), 2019 
WL 1440111 (D.D.C. March 30, 2019). 
 
The Secretary of the Interior released regulations on how to value the 
production of natural gas for royalty purposes. There are three methods of 
valuation. The first methodology values the gas sold to non-affiliated 
entities under arms-length contracts based on the “gross proceeds accruing 
to the lessee.” The second methodology values gas sold to “marketing 
affiliates”, “entities that purchase gas exclusively from producers that own 
or control them”, “based on the downstream sale by the marketing 
affiliate.” The third methodology values gas sold under a “non-arms-
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length" contract under three complex benchmarks that change depending on 
whether the gas is processed or not. Gas Extractor used the first method for 
appraising oil value when selling to a processor between 2003 and 2006. 
The Minerals Management Service (“MMS”) issued an audit, stating that 
the first method for valuation was not viable, because Gas Extractor and 
processor were affiliated entities. Under its method, MMS demanded Gas 
Extractor report and pay nearly two million more dollars in royalties. Gas 
Extractor appealed to the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (“ONRR”), 
which affirmed MMS and found that the first method was ineffective. 
However, ONRR found MMS’s method wrong as well; MMS’s proposed 
method was intended for refined gas sales, and this was a sale of unrefined 
gas. Thus, ONRR used a different method for valuing the gas. Both parties 
appealed and moved for summary judgment. The court held that ONRR’s 
value calculation was not consistent “with the plain language of the 
valuation regulation” because the regulation only dealt with the sale of 
processed gas by Processor, not unprocessed gas sold by Gas Extractor to 
Processor. Consequentially, ONRR’s decision was “clearly erroneous and 
inconsistent with the regulation.” The court also found that ONRR’s 
decision was “arbitrary and capricious” since ONRR failed to explain its 
reasoning behind its proposed valuation regulation calculation. ONRR’s 
decision was also inconsistent; it refused to use one valuation method 
because of the difference between processed and unprocessed gas, but then 
tried to use another method that had the same flaw. The court granted 
summary judgment to Gas Extractor, denying summary judgment to MMS. 
The court remanded the case to ONRR for further proceedings consistent 
with the court’s opinion. 
 
Sierra Club v. Perry, No. 17-CV-2700 (EGS), 2019 WL 1130723 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 12, 2019). 
 
The Sierra Club filed suit on behalf of its members to require the Secretary 
of the Department of Energy to comply with the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007 (“EISA”)’s mandate to establish energy efficiency 
standards for manufactured housing. The Secretary replied to the complaint 
with a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia found that the Sierra club had standing to 
sue under the theory of associational standing by which the organization 
can sue on behalf of its members, if said members would be entitled to sue 
on their own behalf. The Court found that members of the Sierra Club were 
owners and or potential purchasers of manufactured housing who had actual 
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or imminent health, economic, and procedural injury as a result of the 
Secretary’s failure to promulgate standards in accordance with EISA. 
 
W.D. Louisiana 
Evanston Ins. Co. v. Riceland Petroleum Co., 369 F. Supp. 3d 673 (W.D. 
La. 2019). 
 
Insurer brought action against Insured, seeking declaratory judgment that 
policies did not cover Insured’s soil and water contamination. Louisiana’s 
duty to defend has an “Eight Corners Rule,” wherein the court compares the 
four corners of the petition against the four corners of the insurance policy 
to determine whether Insurer has duty to defend Insured. Both Policies have 
clauses excluding coverage for damage by pollutants, and Insurer has 
burden of proof that exclusionary clause applies. Louisiana has a 3-part test 
to determine if this pollution exclusion clause bars coverage, namely (1) 
whether the insured is a “polluter,” (2) whether a pollutant is causing the 
injury; and (3) whether there was a discharge, etc. of a pollutant. The 
purpose of pollution exclusion clauses is to exclude coverage for 
environmental pollution. Under the test, Insured is a polluter, the 
discharged substances are pollutants, as they are normally understood, and 
Insured discharged pollutant and failed to stop the discharge when made 
aware. Also, the pollution was not an “occurrence” within an effective and 
reasonable interpretation of the policy’s coverage that would invoke 
coverage. Insurer also does not have duty to defend the damage to property 
leased, owned, or controlled by Insured, per another policy exclusion. 
Ultimately, the pollution exclusion clauses in the policies preclude 
coverage. Insurer has no duty to defend Insured for environmental pollution 
damage. 
 
D. Montana 
2-Bar Ranch LP v. United States Forest Service, No. CV 18-33-BU-SEH, 
2019 WL 1368086 (D. Mont. March 26, 2019). 
 
Ranchers challenged an administrative decision by the Forest Service 
agency regarding grazing operations in a national forest. The agency, 
following promulgated regulations intending to enforce the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”) and the National Forest 
Management Act (“NFMA”), reduced grazing privileges for Ranchers for 
non-compliance based on a 1997 requirement. Rancher disputed the 
requirement (regarding dry cottonwood allotments), noting that standards 
had shifted over the years and the 1997 requirement was overridden by 
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newer standards. The dispute was analyzed under the Administrative 
Procedures Act (“APA”), which restricts judicial analysis to the 
administrative record and gives substantial deference to the administrative 
decision. The court dismissed the agency’s contention that the judicial 
review was inappropriate for jurisdictional reasons, as (1) each of the 
foundational statutes considered judicial review governed by the APA, (2) 
standing was satisfied as “[a] court need not address standing of each 
plaintiff if it concludes that one plaintiff has standing,” (3) the end of the 
grazing season did not render the issue moot, (4) the determination was a 
final agency action. The court then overturned the agency determination, as 
a plain language interpretation of the most recent plan, a 2009 “Forest 
Plan,” invalidated any potential application of the older, 1997 regulation (or 
subsequent plans up to the 2009 plan). The 2009 standard applied to all 
grazing lands without management plans or operating instructions. Older, 
or different, standards could only be applied if a site had a plan “designed 
specifically for” that site. Although the disputed site had a plan, the new 
standard should have been applied as the plan was not designed specifically 
for the Rancher’s grazing lands. Therefore, the court overturned the agency 
decision as arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The court remanded the 
question of fee shifting. 
 
S.D. New York 
Power Authority of NY v. Tug M/V Ellen S. Bouchard, 14 Civ. 4462 (PAC), 
2019 WL 1410368 (S.D.N.Y March 27, 2019). 
 
The New York Power Authority (“NYPA”) brought suit against Operator 
after a tug dropped anchor and damaged a submarine cable in the Long 
Island Sound. NYPA bore the costs of the environmental response and 
sought remedial damages against Operator under the Oil Pollution Act 
(“OPA”) and the New York Oil Spill Laws (“NYOSL”). The sole issue 
before the court was whether OPA provided the proper framework for 
reimbursing environmental response costs. The anchor damaged an 
underwater cable system that provided electrical power to the area. The 
cable system contained a petroleum-based fluid that acted as a coolant and 
lubricant. The damage resulted in leaked fluid, which in turn required the 
environmental clean-up response. OPA allows a third-party to make claims 
against the originally responsible party for an oil spill in navigable waters 
when the spill occurs from a “vessel” or “facility.” NYPA argued that a 
broad construction of the term “facility” was appropriate and therefore 
applicable to the cable damage. However, as the cables’ primary purpose 
was to transmit electricity rather than store or transfer oil, the court was 
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unpersuaded that OPA’s definition of “facility” applied to the cables. As 
NYPA could not pursue its OPA claim, the question remained of whether 
OPA’s savings clause could allow it to pursue the NYOSL claim outside of 
a different “Limitations Proceeding.” Although the court noted that OPA 
was intended to form a floor, rather than a ceiling, on a state’s pursuit of a 
liability claim, OPA’s savings clause should not be used to disrupt the 
careful balance between federal and state power. Therefore, the court 
denied NYPA’s OPA claim and required that the state pursue its NYOSL 
claim in the Limitations Proceeding. 
 
M.D. North Carolina 
Braswell v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 1:18CV580, 2019 WL 1459053 
(M.D.N.C. April 2, 2019). 
 
Landowner sued Pipeline Company over a gas leak in a gas transportation 
pipe and sued the Restoration Company for harm to Landowner’s property 
from the leak. Restoration Company filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming it 
owned Landowner no duty, breached no duty, and was not the proximate 
cause of Landowner’s. injuries. Restoration Company was only hired by 
Pipeline Company to carry out a site assessment and engage in limited 
remediation efforts through soil testing and excavation activities. The court 
held that the restoration activities left the Restoration Company with no 
duty of care to Landowner’s, because the activities did not threaten any 
harm to Landowner’s property. Landowner also failed to allege any facts 
that showed a violation of such a duty of care, even if it had existed, nor 
allege facts showing that Restoration Companies activities actually caused 
any harm. Landowner mostly alleged facts against Pipeline Company, and 
only mentioned Restoration Company when claiming that both defendants 
were jointly and severally liable for all actions taken. Landowner failed to 
ever identify any specific restoration activities that failed to deal with the 
contamination, thus creating no basis for the claim against Restoration 
Company. The court found that such claims were not enough for even an 
allegation of negligence or willful and reckless conduct. The court thus 
granted Restoration Company’s Motion to Dismiss. 
 
S.D. Ohio 
Rover Pipeline LLC v. Kanzigg, Case No. 2:17-cv-105, 2019 WL 1367675 
(S.D. Ohio March 26, 2019). 
 
In an ex parte hearing, Company requested a temporary restraining order 
that would grant it easements in order to undergo repairs to property around 
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a pipeline. Company operated the pipeline in compliance with certain 
environmental regulations and through the cooperation of various parties 
who granted easements along the pipeline’s route. Company’s issue 
necessitated an equitable remedy by the court because of ongoing “slips” 
along the pipeline. “Slips” referred to rock and soil progression down a 
slope due to “gravity and geologic” forces, and the slips created safety and 
environmental hazards. Company could not address the slips in certain 
areas without easements from the property owners. Six (6) of the eight (8) 
owners in question had granted temporary easements, but the remaining 
two (2) could not be located. The equitable remedy related only to the 
remaining two (2) properties. The court was primarily concerned with the 
lack of notice to the opposing parties—the missing property owners—and 
the irreparability and immediacy of the alleged harm. Company satisfied 
the failure of notice and appearance of the property owners by detailing to 
the court its attempts to identify and locate the owners. The immediacy of 
harm was apparent to the court by the ongoing nature of the “slips” and the 
narrow window state law provided to clear the problem trees (the trees 
housed a protected species and could only be cleared during a certain period 
which would end five (5) days from the hearing). The court was similarly 
satisfied that the potential harm to the pipeline and inability to comply with 
environmental law constituted an irreparable harm. Therefore, the court 
granted the temporary restraining order subject to a bond. 
 
D. Utah 
Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment v. Diesel Power, No. 2:17-CV-
32, 2019 WL 1126347 (D. Utah Mar. 12, 2019). 
 
An environmental organization (“Organization”) brought suit against 
several companies and officers of companies (collectively “Companies”) 
relating to the diesel automotive industry. Companies responded with 
motions to dismiss for lack of standing. The court denied the motion to 
dismiss for lack of standing, finding that there was injury in fact that could 
have been caused by Companies; this injury could be redressed by judicial 
means. The important aspect of this decision centers on the District of 
Utah’s adoption of the responsible corporate officer doctrine with regard to 
civil claims under the Clean Air Act (CAA). The responsible corporate 
officer doctrine first applied to criminal claims under the CAA. This 
doctrine states that officers were subject to CAA liability in their personal 
capacity where said corporate officers had authority to prevent or correct 
CAA violations, failed to exercise that authority, and had knowledge of the 
facts giving rise to the violation. While the Tenth Circuit has yet to decide 
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whether this doctrine applies to civil claims under the CAA, the District of 
Utah decided to adopt this approach, which is followed by several federal 
courts. Under this approach, corporate officers who meet the requirements 
of the responsible corporate officer doctrine of the CAA can be held 
personally liable for violations of the CAA in Utah. 
 
W.D. Washington 
Lighthouse Resources Inc. v. Inslee, Case No. 3:18-cv-05005-RJB, 2019 
WL 1436846 (W.D. Wash. April 1, 2019). 
 
Coal Company and Railroad sued the State of Washington for its denial of a 
water quality certification and denial of a sub-lease of state aquatic land for 
a coal export terminal. Railroad was an intervenor, and brought a foreign 
affairs doctrine claim by itself. Railroad claimed the foreign affairs doctrine 
preempted the denial of the water quality certification. State moved for 
summary dismissal of this claim. Railroad filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment on the claim. The court analyzed two forms of the 
foreign affairs doctrine, the doctrine that state laws that intrude on the 
exclusively federal power over foreign affairs will be preempted, to address 
this claim: conflict preemption and field preemption. Conflict preemption is 
where there is an express conflict between state laws and an executive 
agreement or treaty. Field preemption is where a state law can be 
preempted if it (1) does not concern an area of traditional state 
responsibility and (2) it “intrudes on the federal government’s foreign 
affairs power,” even without an express federal policy. Under conflict 
preemption, the court found that Railroad failed to identify any policy in an 
executive agreement or treaty that contradicted the State’s decision. The 
court also found that field preemption did not apply; the State’s decision 
regarding the water quality certifications was within its general police 
powers and did not “intrude on the federal government’s foreign affairs 
power.” Consequentially, the court granted State’s motion for summary 
dismissal on the foreign affairs preemption claim and denied Railroad’s 
motion for summary judgment. 
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State 
 
Georgia 
Macon-Bibb Cty. Planning and Zoning Comm’n. v. Epic Midstream, LLC, 
862 S.E.2d 403 (Ga. Ct. App Mar. 15, 2019). 
 
This is a discretionary appeal whereby a Planning and Zoning Commission 
(“Commission”) appeals the decision of the superior court whereby the 
court reversed the Commission’s denial of a conditional use permit. In this 
case the Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed the decision of the superior 
court. The appellate court articulated the following standards for review in 
cases of this nature: (1) the superior court is to apply the “any evidence 
standard of review” and (2) appellate courts are to evaluate whether any 
evidence can support the decision of the local governing board when 
reviewing decisions. (citing Bulloch County Bd. of Comm’rs. v. Williams, 
332 Ga. App. 815, 773 S.E.2d 37 (2015)). The issue in this case is that there 
was significant record evidence before Commission to support its decision 
to deny the conditional use application. Evidence included statements from 
project planners and community members, petitions, and assessments. 
Specifically, even though the superior court acknowledged that evidence 
existed to support the conclusion of the zoning commission, the court then 
went a step further and weighed that evidence concluding that the evidence 
was not specific enough to support denial of the application. As the record 
of evidence brought forth to Commission supported the Commission's 
decision to deny the conditional use permit, the superior court erred in 
reversing the decision of the Commission and granting the permit. 
 
Ohio 
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. Ohio Valley Coal Co., No. 17AP-413, 
2019 WL 1313370 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2019). 
 
Gas Pipeline Operator (“Gas Operator”) sought declaratory judgment, quiet 
title, and damages based on surface subsidence from Coal Mine Operator 
(“Coal Operator”). Gas Operator is seeking damages for the cost of 
preventative measures put in place to protect a gas pipeline from damage 
that could result from Gas Operator’s pipeline. Both parties have appealed 
from the trial court’s judgement. The nexus of the appeal was that the trial 
court's judgment was not internally consistent. The court had specifically 
held that the existing coal severance deeds were not enforceable to immune 
Coal Operator from liability but then did not award damages when there 
was evidence of damage incurred by Gas operator. The court addressed 
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issues presented in the appeal as follows. First, the trial court had properly 
applied relevant federal and state statutes governing Coal Operator’s 
obligations; and the subsidence damages waivers found in the coal 
severance deeds are not effective to eliminate or curtail Coal Operator’s 
liability toward Gas Operator for damage to the pipeline. Second, the best 
conclusion that can be drawn from the situation is to apply the 
foreseeability rule to evaluate for damages based on prevention costs as part 
of the total damages suffered. Furthermore, it was both reasonable and 
expected for Gas Operator to take steps to protect its pipeline. The trial 
court erred in not allowing the assignment of damages. 
 
Pennsylvania 
In Re: Penneco Env’t Solutions, Inc., 205 A.3d 401 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Mar. 
8, 2019). 
 
This case concerns a zoning appeal. The original zoning matter involved 
Oil Company, who sought a permit to convert its well from a producing 
well to an underground injection well. A local borough (“Borough”) 
brought suit, challenging the trial court’s reversal of the Zoning Hearing 
Board’s (“ZHB”) decision. ZHB held an initial review of Oil Company’s 
petition to convert the well and denied it. Then ZHB denied Oil Company’s 
challenge to the validity of the relevant ordinance on the ground that it was 
not ripe for review because Oil Company had not yet obtained federal and 
state permits for the proposed conversion of the well. Oil Company 
appealed the denial of the petition to the trial court, and the trial court held 
that ZHB erred in concluding Oil Company’s validity challenge was not 
ripe for review. The challenge was ripe because Oil Company met its 
burden by proving the zoning ordinance improperly excluded a recognized, 
legitimate business activity. ZHB denied Oil Company’s challenge on the 
baseness of ripeness rather than considering the merits. The present court 
has repeatedly held that in cases where permits for land development are 
required from agencies outside a municipality, in a land development 
proposal, it is most appropriate (where applicable) to grant a proposal on 
condition of receiving the outside permits rather than denying the proposal 
outright. Ultimately, the issue was ripe for review and the validity challenge 
should have been reviewed on the merits. Accordingly, the zoning 
ordinance was invalid, and Oil Company was entitled to site-specific relief 
as to the proposed well changes. This court affirms the decision of the trial 
court. 
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